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Abstract Many reverse engineering techniques for data structures rely on the knowledge
of memory allocation routines. Typically, they interpose on the system’s malloc and
free functions, and track each chunk of memory thus allocated as a data structure. However,
many performance-critical applications implement their own custom memory allocators. Exam-
ples include webservers, database management systems, and compilers like gcc and clang. As
a result, current binary analysis techniques for tracking data structures fail on such binaries.
We present MemBrush, a new tool to detect memory allocation and deallocation functions in
stripped binaries with high accuracy. We evaluated the technique on a large number of real world
applications that use custom memory allocators. We demonstrate that MemBrush can detect allo-
cators/deallocators with a high accuracy which is 52 out of 59 for allocators, and 29 out of 31 for
deallocators in SPECINT 2006. As we show, we can furnish existing reverse engineering tools
with detailed information about the memory management API, and as a result perform an anal-
ysis of the actual application specific data structures designed by the programmer. Our system
uses dynamic analysis and detects memory allocation and deallocation routines by searching for
functions that comply with a set of generic characteristics of allocators and deallocators.
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1 Introduction
Many reverse engineering techniques for data structures depend on the analysis of
memory allocated on the heap (Jung and Clark 2009; Slowinska et al. 2011; Lin et al. 2010;
Balakrishnan and Reps 2004; Reps and Balakrishnan 2008). Typically, they interpose on the
system’s malloc and free functions, and track each chunk of memory thus allocated as data
structure. Doing so is well and good for applications that use the standard memory allocation
and de-allocation functions, but unfortunately many larger and performance-critical programs
do not. Instead, they implement their own custom memory managers, typically designed for
efficiency. Well-known examples of such applications include the Apache webserver, the Post-
greSQL database management system, the gcc optimizing compiler, and Dropbox, among many
others. As reverse engineers do not have access to source, the precise memory allocation and
deallocation functions are not known. As a result, all techniques that build on the interposition of
such functions fail.
The problem is that they only see the allocations by the system’s general purpose allocators,
but not the subdivision of these allocations into smaller fragments by the application’s cus-
tom memory allocator (CMA). Unfortunately, the larger chunks that are visible to the reverse
engineer serve merely as a pool for the more relevant allocations of the actual data structures.
Phrased differently, the large chunks themselves are mostly meaningless, while the smaller
fragments are reused by various functions and system calls. Missing them makes it exceed-
ingly difficult to observe any meaningful access patterns and detect the objects designed by the
programmer.
In this paper, we describe a set of techniques to detect memory allocation and deallocation
functions in stripped C binaries with high accuracy. We implemented the techniques in a tool
called MemBrush and evaluated it on a large number of custom memory allocators. We also
evaluated our techniques on several C++ binaries, but while the initial results look promising,
this was not the focus of our work and needs further evaluation in the future. MemBrush is an
off-line, heuristics-based tool which uses dynamic taint analysis. By examining the heuristics
during a binary’s execution, MemBrush will first extract a set of possible allocator/deallocator
candidates. Later these candidates are validated by replaying them. In the evaluation section we
show that MemBrush can detect allocator/deallocators with a high accuracy which is 52 out of 59
for allocators, and 29 out of 31 for deallocators in SPECINT 2006. While the memory overhead is
considerable, due for instance to the (taint) information we store during runtime, we demonstrate
that the method is practical by applying it to real-world programs.
The main goal of MemBrush is to furnish existing reverse engineering tools, disassemblers
and debuggers with detailed information about the memory management API implemented by
a CMA. Knowing the CMA’s allocation, deallocation, and reallocation routines, allows us to
interpose on them and take the memory analysis techniques for general-purpose allocators and
reuse them in applications that ‘roll their own’. To demonstrate its usefulness, we use MemBrush
to support an existing reverse engineering tool called Howard (Slowinska et al. 2011). Howard is
a tool to extract low-level data structures from a stripped binary. Thanks to MemBrush, Howard
was able to extract heap structures that it would otherwise not have been able to detect. As a
result, we can perform an analysis of the application specific data structures designed by the
programmer.
In addition, researchers have shown that knowledge of memory allocation and dealloca-
tion routines is useful for retrofitting security in existing binaries—for instance to protect
against memory corruption (valgrind, http://valgrind.org; Hastings and Joyce 1992; Dhurjati and
Adve 2006; Caballero et al. 2012; Perence, B: Electric Fence, http://perens.com/FreeSoftware/
ElectricFence; Slowinska et al. 2012). Currently, these security measures are powerless if the
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application uses CMAs. Again, with MemBrush these existing techniques should simply work,
regardless of the memory allocator.
High-level Overview The key observation behind MemBrush is that memory allocation func-
tions have characteristics that set them apart from other routines. For instance, a malloc-like
routine will return a heap address and malloc’s clients will use pointers derived from that
address to access memory. MemBrush checks these characteristics at runtime taking care to filter
out routines that exhibit similar behavior (like wrappers, iterators, etc.) as much as possible.
Like all dynamic analysis, MemBrush’s results depend on the code that is covered at run-
time. Specifically, it will not find CMA routines in code that never executes. This paper is not
about code coverage techniques. Rather, we use test suites to cover as much of the application
as possible. Fortunately, applications that employ CMAs, typically use the allocation routines
frequently—after all, that is why they have them in the first place. Thus, finding inputs that exer-
cise the CMA code is not very difficult, and MemBrush correctly identified almost 90% of all
the CMA routines in all the applications we tested.
In summary, MemBrush is able to unearth most CMA routines in arbitrary (gcc-generated)
binaries with a high degree of precision. While it is too early to claim that the problem of CMA
identification is solved, MemBrush advances the state of the art significantly. For instance, we
managed to accurately analyze the complex CMA systems used by the Nginx webserver, or the
ProFTPd file server.
We implemented all dynamic analysis techniques using Intel’s Pin dynamic binary instrumen-
tation framework (Intel 2011). Our current implementation works with x86 C (and some C++)
binaries on Linux generated by the gcc optimising compiler, but the approach is not specific to
any particular OS or compiler.
Outline The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with a back-
ground information and we discuss the essential characteristics of CMAs that lay the foundation
of our detection algorithm. Sections 3-7 describe the details of MemBrush’s technique to detect
the CMA routines. We evaluate MemBrush in Section 8, and discuss its limitations in Section 9.
Finally, we talk about the related work in Section 10, and we conclude in Section 11.
This paper is an extended version of our WCRE 2013 publication (Chen et al. 2013).
2 Background and Observations
Programmers incorporate custom memory allocators into their applications to improve perfor-
mance, and in the case of region-based allocators – to reduce the programming burden and
eliminate a source of memory leaks.
Under the hood, CMAs use general-purpose memory allocation routines, such as malloc
and mmap, to allocate large buffers, and then define their own custom functions to allocate these
buffers into smaller ones. Applications use the resulting blocks to store structured data items
such as arrays, structs, or C++ objects. When an application releases a block, a CMA does not
immediately return the memory to the general-purpose allocator. Instead, it may serve it on a
future request by the application and defer the real deallocation (for instance, until the time that
no more requests are to be expected from the application). As we explain in Section 2.2, when
detecting CMAs, it is important to ignore wrappers—functions that only perform certain tests,
e.g., for null pointers, before returning an object already obtained from a general-purpose or
custom allocator.
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Rather than aiming for a particular custom memory allocator, the objective of MemBrush is
to detect any CMA. In Section 2.1, we therefore introduce popular types of custom memory allo-
cators. Then, in Section 2.2, we list the essential characteristics of CMAs that lay the foundation
for our detection algorithm described in Sections 3–6.
2.1 A Taxonomy of CMAs
Since comprehensive overviews of CMAs can be found in surveys by Wilson et al. (1995) and
Berger et al. (2002), we limit ourselves to a summary of the approaches in this section. Like
Berger et al. (2002), we distinguish the following five categories:
Per-class Allocators (also known as slab allocators). A per-class allocator retains memory
to contain data objects of the same type (or size). It implements the same API as a general-
purpose memory allocator (malloc/free), i.e., it supports allocation and deletion of individual
objects. Slab allocators are widely used by many Unix and Unix-like operating systems including
FreeBSD (The FreeBSD Project: FreeBSD Kernel Developers Manual. ZONE(9), http://www.
freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=uma) (“zones”) and Linux (Jones 2007).
Regions (also known as arenas, groups, and zones (Ross 1967; Hanson 1990)). Each object
allocated by an application is assigned to a region, i.e., a large chunk of memory. Program-
mers can only deallocate all objects from a region at once – individual deallocations are not
possible. This limitation facilitates allocation and deallocation of memory with a low per-
formance overhead, at the cost of an increased memory usage. Example applications using
regions include Apache (The Apache Software Foundation: Developing modules for the Apache
HTTP Server 2.4, http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/developer/modguide.html) (which refers to
them as “pools”), PostgreSQL (The PostgreSQL Global Development Group: PostgreSQL 9.2.4
Documentation. Section 43.3. Memory Management, http://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.2/static/
spi-memory.html) (which refers to them as “memory contexts”), and Nginx (nginx: nginx
documentation, http://nginx.org/en/docs/).
Obstacks An obstack (The GNU C library. Obstacks, http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/
html node/Obstacks.html ) is a more generic version of a region. It contains a stack of objects,
within which an individual object is freed along with everything allocated in this obstack since
the creation of the object. An example application using obstacks is the gcc compiler (GNU
libiberty: Obstacks, http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/libiberty/Obstacks.html).
Custom Patterns This category includes all allocators that implement the same API as a
general-purpose memory allocator (malloc/free), but are tailored to the needs of a particular
application. For example, one of the allocators used by Nginx falls into this category.
Hybrid approaches The research community has proposed various approaches to provide e.g.,
high-speed allocation and cache-level locality. For instance, reaps (Berger et al. 2002) are a com-
bination of regions and general-purpose allocators that extend region semantics with individual
object deletion.
2.2 Essential Characteristics of CMAs
Having looked at the different categories of CMA, we now summarize their common features. It
is important to emphasize that these features aim to capture the fundamental behavior of CMAs
and not some implementation artifact of specific variants. For instance, all of the eight CMA
implementations that we analyze in Section 8 exhibit these characteristics. As we will see in
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Sections 3–6, these characteristics form the basis for our detection algorithm. We will discuss
allocation, deallocation, and reallocation routines in turn. In a generic sense, we will refer to
these custom functions as c malloc, c free, and c realloc, respectively.
Allocation Routines c malloc functions subdivide large memory chunks obtained from a
general-purpose allocator into small ones, and serve the small ones upon the application’s
requests. We make the following basic observations about a custom allocator’s behavior:
1. Normally, a c malloc function returns a pointer p that references a heap memory region.
As we discuss below, in some cases this rule should be relaxed. E.g., a c malloc does not
need to literally return p, but it might pass it through an outgoing argument (return a
pointer).
2. Applications use p or a pointer derived from p, e.g., (p+offset), to write to memory.
Here also, we expect some deviations from such behavior. For instance, it is possible that
the occasional application allocates a memory block that it does not use. However, this
should be the exception, rather than the rule. If the application (almost) never writes to
memory referenced by p, then the function that returns it does not serve as an allocator
(write to the allocated memory).
3. Unless the c malloc function initializes memory chunks prior to returning them, the
application should write to these chunks before reading them (no read before write).
4. A c malloc should not return the same object twice until that chunk is released first with
a call to a c free function (no aliasing).
5. Since we aim to exclude wrapper functions, we require that a c malloc not only checks
and passes a pointer obtained from another internal function, but also performs some
computations to derive the address of a newly allocated object (no wrappers).
As we will see in Sections 4 and 8, these features accurately capture the behaviour of alloca-
tion functions. Observe that, A1, A4 and A5 refer to the internal characteristics of an allocator,
while A2 and A3 specify how an application interacts with it.
A1 captures the basic characteristic of a memory allocation routine: once the allocator allo-
cates a memory buffer, the application needs to learn about its location. MemBrush assumes that
the allocator returns a pointer that references the heap memory region. As we demonstrate with
our experiments, this assumption usually holds in practice, and is sufficient to deal with real
world applications (refer to Section 8). However, in theory, a c malloc does not need to literally
return a pointer, but it might pass it through an outgoing argument. Similarly, it does not need to
return a proper C/C++ pointer, but it might provide an offset that the application subsequently
adds to the address of a buffer to compute the pointer. Since we have never encountered the latter
scenario in practice, we consider it to be purely hypothetical, and we mention it for the sake of
completeness only. However, as we discuss in Section 9, MemBrush could be extended to also
cater to the two aforementioned corner cases.
Unlike, say, sorting or encryption routines, an allocation function is expected to return a dif-
ferent result every time it is called. Indeed, only when a memory chunk is released, a c malloc
can allocate it again. A4 captures this observation.
Features A1, A4 and A5 alone let MemBrush identify c malloc routines, but they may also
lead to an overapproximation. A prominent example of a possible misclassification would be
iterators. When traversing a container, an iterator returns pointers to elements of the container,
satisfying A1, and just like an allocator it provides a sequence of distinct memory objects, satis-
fying A4. Only by observing how the application uses the memory buffers – with rules A2 and
A3 – can MemBrush distinguish an allocator from an iterator. Indeed, the objects returned by an
iterator are usually initialized already, so they do not need to be updated first (A3), and can be
only read (A2).
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Deallocation Routines When an application frees a chunk of memory obtained from a c malloc
routine, c free reclaims the chunk, so that it can be served again on future requests. The
algorithms in Section 5 are based on the following characteristics of deallocators:
(D1) CMAs keep track of which parts of memory are in use, and which parts are free. They
record the locations and sizes of free blocks in some kind ofmetadata, which may be a list,
a tree, a bitmap or another data structure. Thus, a c free function accesses the metadata
that is also maintained by a c malloc function (metadata sharing).
(D2) When a c free releases a memory region, the application should not access it anymore
unless there is a bug (and we assume bugs are rare) (no use-after-free).
(D3) When a c free releases a memory object, a c malloc may return it on future application’s
requests. (Observe that this feature is strongly related to A4.)
(D4) Since we aim to exclude wrapper and internal helper functions, we select the outermost
function that shares the metadata with a c malloc. The intuition is that if a function does
use the metadata, it should be considered a part of the CMA. If both a caller and its callee
share the metadata with a c malloc, MemBrush selects the outer one. Since each of them
does use the metadata, both should be considered a part of the CMA (understand the
interface functions).
Observe that the above characteristics of deallocation routines reflect the interaction between
c malloc and c free functions. As we will see in Section 5, to detect c free routines, MemBrush
searches for functions that it can couple with the already identified c malloc routines.
Reallocation Routines Finally, c realloc functions allow applications to modify the size of a
previously allocated memory block. To guarantee that the new block is contiguous in mem-
ory, c realloc may have to relocate it elsewhere. We consider the following features of c realloc
routines:
(R1) Like c malloc in A1, c realloc functions return a pointer p to a heap memory region (return
a pointer).
(R2) Like property (D1) for deallocation functions (D1), c realloc functions also access the
metadata used by a c malloc (metadata sharing).
(R3) As in (A2) and (A3), applications use p or a pointer derived from p to write to memory,
and write to the allocated memory before reading it (write to the allocated memory).
(R4) Once a c reallocmodifies the size of a buffer, future repetitions of the same request do not
require any action, so also do not relocate it (idempotence).
(R5) A c realloc preserves the contents of a memory block up to the lesser of the new and old
sizes. Thus, if the block is relocated, a c realloc copies the old contents to the new location
(copy on relocation).
When R5 finds that a c realloc function relocates a buffer, we additionally verify R6–R7
below:
(R6) As a c realloc combines a c malloc and a c free, it also releases a memory object, and the
application should not access it anymore (as in D2).
(R7) Like c free in D3, if a c realloc releases a memory object, a c malloc might return it on
future application’s requests.
Even though the above features reflect the expected behavior of CMAs, we emphasize that
MemBrush allows for occasional deviations. For example, it is possible that an application has
a use-after-free bug, and uses a chunk of memory even though it has been deallocated already,
violating D2. Also, even though an application should not read uninitialized memory (a breach of
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A3), we might occasionally observe such behavior. As we will see later, in Section 8, we permit
such exceptions as long as they are rare. However, in practice, we did not come across them.
3 A Bird’s Eye View of MemBrush
We now discuss the CMA detection procedure. MemBrush consists of instrumentation mod-
ules and detection modules (see Fig. 1). The instrumentation modules, , provide support
(such as dynamic information flow tracking) for the detection modules, while the detection
modules, , search for the CMA routines. In this section, we briefly introduce the various
components, and in the next four sections, we explain the detection modules in detail.
In this paper, we search for CMA routines that operate on top of the mmap/brk system calls
or the libclibrary (i.e., that internally call malloc/free) to allocate large chunks of memory.
However, we can configure MemBrush to detect the Doug Lea allocator (Doug Lea: A Memory
Allocator, http://g.oswego.edu/dl/html/malloc.html) used by the GNUC library as well. To do so,
we would simply choose not to search for allocators based on malloc, but solely on mmap/brk,
and we do not assume any knowledge about the libc semantics.
We implemented MemBrush using Intel’s Pin dynamic binary instrumentation frame-
work (Intel 2011). Pin provides a rich API to monitor context information, e.g., register or
memory contents, on program instructions, functions and system calls.
The main components of Fig. 1 are the following:
Inputs: The main input to MemBrush is a (possibly) stripped x86 binary and its
inputs . For this paper, we used existing test suites to cover as much of the application as
possible. If needed, we can also employ a code coverage tool for binaries like S2E (Chipounov
et al. 2011).
Call stack tracking: To analyze if a function’s behavior is characteristic for a CMA rou-
tine, membrush monitors the function and its callees. For that, it keeps track of the context in
the function call stack.
Our implementation follows Slowinska et al. (2011). In a nutshell, as membrush runs the
application in a binary instrumentation framework, it can dynamically observe call and ret
instructions, and the current position of the runtime stack. A complicating factor is that some-
times call is used not to invoke a real function, but only as part of a call/pop sequence to
read the value of the instruction pointer. Similarly, not every ret has a corresponding call
instruction.
Fig. 1 MemBrush: high-level overview
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For the purpose of our analysis, we define a function as the target of a call instruction which
returns with a ret instruction. Values of the stack pointer at the time of the call and at the time of
the return match, giving a simple criterion for detecting uncoupled call and ret instructions.
Partial reconstruction of physical stack frame: To detect CMA routines, membrush
needs to partially reconstruct the physical stack frame of a function. Specifically, it identifies all
the stack-based procedure arguments. Like Slowinska et al. (2011), our current implementation
is based on dynamic analysis. In a nutshell, we monitor how a function calculates pointers to
access stack variables pushed by its caller. If necessary, we can extend it with a static analysis
presented by ElWazeer et al. (2013).
Additionally, to determine a first set of candidates for c malloc and c realloc routines,
membrush monitors the return value of each executed function, and checks if it is a pointer
dereferencing a heap memory region. Since in gcc generated binaries, 32-bit return values are
normally passed using the EAX register, membrush implements this policy as well1.
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT): As we shall explain later, the detection
modules rely on dynamic information flow tracking (for data flow analysis). Our tracker is an
extended version of libdft (Kemerlis et al. 2012). Like most other DIFT engines (Portokalidis
et al. 2006), we propagate information on direct flows only: we copy tags on data move opera-
tions, or them on ALU operations, and clean tags on common ia32 idioms to zero memory,
such as xor $eax, $eax. We do not propagate any information on indirect data flows, such
as conditional statements.
Pointer tracking: membrush monitors how the application uses pointers returned by the
c malloc and c realloc candidates. To this end, the pointer tracking module tracks how pointers to
heap memory derive from other pointers, and where they are stored. Our implementation is based
on (Slowinska et al. 2011) which extends the generic DIFT module with pointer propagation
rules.
Detection modules: The detection modules identify the actual CMA API:
c malloc, c free, and c realloc. membrush’s algorithms check for the characteristic features dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, and search for the routines in turn. In the first step , membrush
determines c malloc routines. Then , it tries to find c free functions that can be coupled with the
already detected allocation functions. In the last step , it identifies c realloc routines. Finally ,
we perform an additional analysis of the detected CMA routines to classify the CMA according
to the taxonomy from Section 2.1.
The current implementation of membrush handles gcc-generated binaries. However, the
characteristics of the CMA routines that membrush relies on are generic and compiler inde-
pendent. In principle, we could port membrush to other platforms or use it to analyze binaries
compiled with different compilers. The implementation would differ though, e.g., depending on
the calling convention, we would need to adjust our analysis of the arguments passed to functions
or the calling context. We leave that as a future work.
4 Custom Allocator Detection
To detect c malloc routines, membrush searches for functions that match the requirements A1-
A5 from Section 2.2. Figure 2 represents the procedure as a linear pipeline, in which each stage
progressively filters out functions that do not comply with the corresponding features.
1While return values proved sufficient in practice, we could extend the technique to handle results returned
in parameters also.
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Fig. 2 Detection of c malloc functions
membrush starts by identifying a crude set of c malloc candidates, i.e., functions that return
pointers referencing heap memory regions (A1). As we said before, we currently focus on func-
tions that pass the return value using the EAX register. While the application executes, membrush
uses the pointer tracking module to track all pointers derived from the addresses returned by
the general-purpose memory allocators, such as mmap or malloc. This way, it also follows a
custom allocator calculating the locations of allocated objects. membrush monitors the return
values of all functions invoked at runtime, and selects the ones that return either a tracked pointer
or a single constant that might indicate an error, e.g., NULL.
To verify A2, membrush uses dynamic taint analysis to track all pointers derived from the
return value of each c malloc candidate, and monitors if they are used to write to memory. More
specically, when a c malloc candidate returns, MemBrush assigns a unique color to the returned
value. The taint analysis engine keeps propagating the color until a memory access occurs. At
that point, membrush checks the color of the dereferenced pointer, to identify the source c malloc
candidate.
To assess A3, membrush additionally examines if the application uses these pointers to write
to a memory location before reading it. Unless the allocator initializes the memory itself, the
presence of such read-before-writes suggests either that the candidate is no c malloc function,
or (if the occurrence is rare) that the application is buggy. To deal with allocators that initialize
their own memory, membrush tags all memory locations written by the candidate function (or its
callees) with a unique identifier, so that is able to spot the uninitialized reads later.
Next, we retain from the remaining c malloc candidates only those functions that never return
the same memory region again until it is deallocated by a c free (A4). We start with a big picture,
and continue with the implementation details.
Our approach draws on load testing. The basic idea is that we insert a “call loop” that repeats
specific invocations of the candidate functions many times. As long as we ensure that the appli-
cation does not release the allocated region with a call to a c free routine, we would expect a
proper c malloc to return a stream of distinct addresses in accordance with (A1). The candidate
progresses to the next stage if either (1) it (or one of its callees) invokes the general-purpose
allocator to allocate a new memory region and returns a pointer referencing it, or (2) it begins
to return a non-pointer value consistently, possibly indicating that the application has run out
of memory and cannot allocate any extra. In contrast, we drop the c malloc candidate if (1) the
application crashes, (2) the return value is a pointer already seen during the load test, or (3) the
return value is neither a pointer nor an invariable error message.
The implementation relies on a partial reconstruction of the physical stack frame of the
c malloc candidate . First, we pause the execution at a call instruction that transfers the con-
trol flow to the candidate function, and we store the CPU context of the call site. Specifically, we
record the values of the registers and the stack-based arguments. In order to replay the invoca-
tion, membrush repeatedly resets the CPU context to the recorded one, restarts the execution at
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the call instruction, pauses it again when the function returns, and examines the return value.
Figure 3 illustrates the procedure. Observe that the replay loop might corrupt the state of the
application or cause a memory leak. Indeed, it allocates a number of buffers, which are never
released. To err on the safe side, we restart the application after this step. membrush ensures to
do the replay for every candidate function. However, it does not replay all its invocations, but a
number of randomly chosen ones.
Finally, we filter out allocator wrappers (A5). membrush classifies a c malloc candidate as a
wrapper if (1) it (or one of its callees) invokes a function actually categorized as an allocator, and
(2) whenever it returns a pointer, it passes a value received from a callee without modifying it.
The implementation builds on the call stack and pointer tracking modules .
5 Custom Deallocator Detection
To detect c free routines, membrush searches for functions that it can couple with the already
identified c malloc routines. A c free function matches a c malloc routine if they share their
metadata, and allocate/release the same memory regions. The procedure is similar to that for
c malloc functions in that membrush filters candidate functions in a linear pipeline of stages
where each stage verifies one of the conditions D1-D4 of Section 2.2. Figure 4 illustrates a
high-level picture.
The first stage is based on the observation that CMA routines share some kind of metadata
that records the positions of free blocks. Hence, a c free routine accesses data in memory which
c malloc also uses to derive the return values (D1). membrush first pinpoints the metadata, and
then monitors the application to identify the functions that read or modify it, which become c free
candidates.
membrush determines the metadata while c malloc functions execute. First, when a c malloc
accesses a heap or static memory location for the first time, membrush tags it with a unique
identifier. Then, it employs the DIFT module to maintain a data flow graph which records how
these values propagate and how they are combined. When the c malloc routine returns, membrush
pinpoints the metadata: it consults the graph, and lists all memory locations that contributed to
the calculation of the return value. Observe that the metadata might represent either pointers or
indices/offsets which a CMA uses to compute the addresses of allocated regions. As membrush
employs a generic DIFT approach, it is impervious to such implementation details.
Finally, membrush monitors the application to identify the functions that access the metadata
used by c malloc routines. Each of them becomes a c free candidate. As in Section 4, membrush
analyzes the candidates in turn.
Fig. 3 The replay procedure
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Fig. 4 Detection of c free functions
The next two stages build on the observation that c malloc and c free routines handle the
same memory regions. First, membrush verifies that once a c free candidate releases a buffer,
the application does not access it any more (D2). Then, it tries to make the CMA serve again a
memory chunk that has just been reclaimed by a c free candidate (D3). Both steps require that,
for each c free invocation, membrush pinpoints at least one matching c malloc invocation, i.e., a
c malloc which allocated a buffer reclaimed by a call to the c free candidate.
In a nutshell, membrush has two ways to couple c malloc and c free invocations. The first one
relies on an accurate parameter match between the two functions. membrush requires that all the
arguments of the c free candidate are either the arguments or the return value of a past c malloc
invocation. In the second (more generic) method, a c malloc and a c free invocation match if they
use the same metadata. Observe that the mapping need not be one-to-one. For instance, for region
based allocators, we expect multiple c malloc invocations to match a single c free candidate.
Following D2, membrush requires that once a c free candidate releases a buffer, the applica-
tion does not access it any more (D2). Unless there is a use-after-free bug in the application, the
presence of such accesses suggests that the candidate is not a c free function. In practice, we tol-
erate some use-after-free accesses to allow for bugs in the code, but the number of such accesses
should be less than . In our experiments, we used  = 1%.
To analyze an invocation of a c free candidate, membrush identifies a matching c malloc invo-
cation, and monitors all accesses to the associated heap buffer. If the application still uses this
buffer after the c free candidate returns, it means that the candidate function did not actually
release the memory, so it does not progress to the next step.
D3 states that when c free reclaims a chunk of memory, the CMAmay serve it again on future
requests. To verify a c free candidate, we trick c malloc into reallocating the reclaimed memory.
When the candidate deallocator returns, we search the current execution trace for a c malloc
invocation that allocated a buffer in the memory that was apparently just freed, and we replay it
many times in a call loop, as explained in Section 4. We retain the c free candidate if the allocator
returns the same pointer as the invocation being replayed. In contrast, we drop the candidate
if the c malloc function fails to reallocate that memory region—because it crashes, returns an
error message, or requests more memory from the general-purpose allocator. As in Section 4, we
restart the application after this step.
Finally, we decide which functions form the CMA interface (D4). If multiple functions in
the same call stack reached this step, we pick the outermost one. The intuition is that functions
above the CMA interface never directly access the metadata. Thus, if a function uses it, it must
be CMA-related.
6 Custom Reallocator Detection
To detect c realloc routines, we again generate a set of candidates candidates, and then verify
them against R1-R7 of Section 2.2 in pipeline-fashion. Figure 5 presents an overview of the
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Fig. 5 Detection of c realloc functions
algorithm. We will see that detection of reallocation routines reuses many steps of the previ-
ous sections. This makes sense, because a reallocation combines properties of deallocation and
allocation.
First, we identify c realloc candidates as those functions that return pointers to heap objects,
and that share the metadata with c malloc routines (R1 and R2). The implementation of this
stages draws heavily on the checks for A1 and D1. Next, to verify if the application uses a pointer
returned by a c realloc candidate to write to the reallocated heap buffer in a write-before-read
fashion (R3), we reuse the verification of A2 and A3.
R4 requires that if a c realloc candidate repeatedly serves a specific request, only the first
invocation should trigger an action and may relocate the buffer. Again, we confirm this behavior
by replaying the invocations. Specifically, when the candidate returns, membrush replays this
invocation many times in a call loop, and retains the candidate only if the returned value remains
constant.
Next, we analyze if an invocation of a c realloc candidate relocates a memory block to mod-
ify its size (R5). To confirm that the memory block is not relocated (but only resized), a simple
test could check that a pointer returned by the candidate indicates an object allocated by a
c malloc function that is not yet freed. Observe, however, that this requires an ability to accu-
rately pinpoint all objects released by c free routines. As we explain in Section 9, there exist
CMA implementations which make it very challenging.
membrush, on the other hand, leverages the fact that c realloc preserves the contents of real-
located memory blocks. Thus, when a c realloc function relocates an object, it also copies the
old contents. To detect the copy operation, membrush uses the DIFT module . It monitors if
the c realloc candidate (or any of its callees) copies data from a buffer already allocated by a
c malloc. In case of a relocation, membrush expects a copy of a contiguous block from an address
returned by a c malloc to the return value of the candidate. The source of this operation is the
reallocated buffer.
This mechanism selects only these c realloc candidates that relocate a memory block at least
once during our analysis. Indeed, otherwise the application does not perform the buffer copy
operation, and membrush cannot proceed to the sixth step (R6). This requirement potentially
limits the completeness of the detection algorithm if a c realloc function is always called to shrink
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a memory region, and never to extend it. Even though we did not find it to be a problem during
our experiments, an alternative implementation could also examine if the reallocation was in
place, i.e., returned a pointer to an already allocated object.
When the previous stage concludes that an invocation of a c realloc candidate relocates a
buffer, we also confirm that the application does not access the reallocated buffer anymore (R6),
and that the memory block is in fact freed (R7). This check is identical to the verification of D2
and D3—again, we monitor the released memory, and we trick c malloc routines into reallocating
it. The reallocated buffer determines the c malloc invocation we need to replay.
7 Additional Analysis of the CMA Routines
We now unearth additional characteristics of CMAs. First, we describe membrush’s heuristic to
estimate the size of buffers requested through c malloc/c realloc functions, and then we discuss
how we distinguish between the different types of allocators from Section 2.1.
7.1 Buffer Size Estimation
Besides finding the CMA, it is often useful also to determine the size of the memory that is allo-
cated. For instance, knowing the size of memory chunks helps in tasks like reverse engineering,
and hunting for heap-based bugs. Before we describe membrush’s procedure to estimate how
much memory the application requests from a custom allocator routine, observe that it is not a
trivial task. After all, since the application may well allocate more memory than it will need dur-
ing our tests, we cannot just monitor how much of the buffer is actually used. membrush, instead,
first collects a number of sample c malloc2 invocations along with an upper boundary on the
size of the allocated buffers. Then, it tries to devise a formula capturing the relation between an
argument of the c malloc function and the associated size.
The collection of samples is again based on the replay mechanism. membrush replays a
number of a c malloc function invocations many times, and for each of them, it monitors the
stream of returned values. When the allocator serves two consecutive requests from the same
region obtained from the general purpose allocator, membrush measures the distances between
them. They represent the upper bound on the size of the allocated buffers. Additionally, if mem-
brush finds that the CMA stores the metadata between the chunks returned to the application, it
excludes these bytes from the distance measurement.
Observe that, we should only include the distances between memory chunks adjacent to each
other, lest we significantly overestimate the upper bound on their size. To this end, membrush
waits for the c malloc function to invoke the general-purpose allocator to allocate a new memory
region, and serve the requests from it (refer to the verification of A4 in Section 4). This way, we
are certain that we keep track of all the buffers allocated in that region, so our estimation of their
size is as accurate as possible.
Depending on the location of the metadata, we can distinguish between the following three
cases:
1. The CMA stores the metadata and the allocated buffers apart (refer to Fig. 6a). In this case,
the distances between the newly allocated buffers accurately represent their sizes.
2. The CMA stores the metadata in front of the newly allocated buffer. This scenario is illus-
trated in Fig. 6b, where a c malloc routine is invoked twice to subsequently allocate buffers
A, and B, and return pointers pA, and pB, respectively. During the allocation of B, c malloc
2We follow exactly the same procedure for c reallocsmall routines.
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Fig. 6 Buffer size estimation: grey regions represent metadata kept by the allocator, white regions represent
the newly allocated buffers
does not access the region occupied by buffer A, yet it updates metaB – the metadata associ-
ated with B. membrush monitors the memory locations modified by c malloc to distinguish
the buffer allocated by the application (A) from the metadata (metaB). The distance between
the beginning of metaB and A accurately determines the size of the buffer.
3. The CMA stores the metadata behind the newly allocated buffer. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 6c, where a c malloc routine is again invoked twice to subsequently allocate buffers
A, and B, and return pointers pA, and pB, respectively. If the allocator does not initialize the
newly allocated buffer, membrush can again pinpoint the metadata associated with A, and
precisely estimate the size of the memory request. Conversely, if the allocator does initialize
the newly allocated buffer, membrush cannot find the boundary between the buffer (A) and
the metadata (metaA). As a consequence, the distance between the beginning of the buffers
represents an overapproximated size of the memory request.
In the second step, for each c malloc routine, membrush tries to derive a formula describing
the size of an allocated buffer as a function of an argument of the c malloc. Specifically, when
we denote the size of the allocation request and the value of one of the arguments of the c malloc
function by size and arg, respectively, we assume that the CMA uses one of the following
formulas:
size = a1 ∗ arg + b1 or size = a2 ∗ 2arg + b2.
Next, for each argument variable of the allocator, argi , we consider all the collected pairs of the
maximum estimated size and argi , (max size, argi), and we search for values of a1, b1, a2, and
b2 such that
max size ≥ a1 ∗ argi + b1 and max size ≥ a2 ∗ 2argi + b2.
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Finally, we select (a1 and b1) or (a2 and b2) that fit the samples best, i.e., minimize the cumulative
distance between the values of the formula and the boundary sizes.
As we show in Section 8, membrush’s mechanism yields good results in practice with only
very few exceptions. It does not work only if the object size is determined when the application
initializes an instance of an allocator, and not when it allocates a buffer. Then, different invoca-
tions of the allocator function result in different allocation sizes, yet we cannot find a relation
between them and the function’s arguments. For this reason, we did not manage to fully analyze
the ngx array push(a) function in the nginx webserver. It serves requests from the array
a passed as an argument. The problem is that the application determines the size of the buffers
when creating the array.
7.2 Classification of CMAs
To classify CMAs, we examine two characteristics: the sizes of allocated buffers, and the relation
between the allocation and deallocation routines. Additionally, we need a means to distinguish
generic regions from obstacks.
First, we check if a CMA splits a region obtained from a general-purpose allocator into equal-
sized chunks. To this end, we monitor objects whose addresses are derived from the base of a
particular malloc/mmap buffer, and we compare their sizes. Next, we assess if a deallocator
releases individual or multiple objects at once. To find it out, we check how many c malloc
invocations match a single invocation of a c free (refer to Step 1 in Section 5).
Table 1 summarizes the decision procedure. As the basic criteria are stringent enough to dis-
tinguish all allocator types except from obstacks, we adopt just one extra one. Observe that, since
obstacks allow for the freeing of objects allocated since the creation of any object in the region,
allocations following a call to a c free function do not necessarily start at the bottom of the region,
but at any location inside it. Thus, we monitor streams of addresses of objects within individual
regions, and we check if their increasing subsequences start at the same location.
Even though it was not necessary in our experiments, we could additionally validate the per-
class allocators. Instead of comparing only the sizes of allocated objects, we can also examine
their low-level data structures. We demonstrate this procedure in Section 8.3.
8 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate membrush. We discuss its accuracy (Section 8.1), present some statis-
tics illustrating the detection procedure (Section 8.2), and finally we demonstrate the practical
Table 1 Membrush’s criteria to classify CMAs
Allocator Equal-sized Individual Multiple
chunks object deallocation
Per-class   ×
Regionsa × × 
Obstacksa × × 
Custom patterns ×  ×
Hybrid approaches ×  
aWe use additional criteria to distinguish regions from obstacks
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benefits of applying membrush to an existing binary analysis technique for reverse engineering
data structures (Section 8.3).
8.1 Accuracy of membrush’s Detection Algorithm
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of membrush. We start with an overview of the appli-
cations we tested, and we report how well membrush managed to pinpoint the CMA routines.
Then, we continue with a classification of CMAs. Finally, we discuss the accuracy of membrush’s
heuristic to estimate the size of buffers requested through c malloc functions.
The accuracy of the CMA routines detection. Table 2 presents an overview of the appli-
cations we analyzed with membrush. The list contains five real-world programs, including the
Apache and Nginx webservers, smbget from the Samba networking tool, the ProFTPD file
server, and wget (configured to use the lockless allocator (Lockless: Lockless Performance,
http://locklessinc.com)). Additionally, we applied membrush to the SpecINT 2006 benchmark-
ing suite. It contains both applications that employ a CMA and applications that do not. To verify
membrush’s accuracy, we compare the results to the actual CMA routines in the programs. Thus,
all the results presented in this section were obtained for binaries for which we could also consult
the source code and get the ground truth. For each application, we report the number of detected
CMA routines compared to the number of the CMA routines in the application (true positives,
TPs), and the number of functions mistakenly classified as CMA routines (false positives, FPs).
Table 2 The accuracy of membrush’s algorithm. in detecting c mallocsmall, c freesmall, and c reallocsmall
routines. The top part of the table reports the results for 5 real-world applications, and the bottom one — for
the SpecInt 2006 benchmarking suite
Application Allocators Deallocators Reallocators
TPs FPs TPs FPs TPs FPs
apache 3/5 - 4/6 - 0/1 -
nginx 7/7 - 2/2 - 0/0 -
smbget (samba) 1/1 - 1/1 - 1/1 -
wget 1/1 - 1/1 - 1/1 -
proftpd 6/6 - 5/5 - 0/0 -
400.perlbench 14/16 - 5/5 - 0/0 -
401.bzip2 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
403.gcc 14/17 4 5/5 - 0/0 -
429.mcf 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
446.gobmk 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
456.hmmer 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
458.sjeng 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
462.libquantum 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
464.h26ref 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
471.omnetpp 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
473.astar 0/0 - 0/0 - 0/0 -
483.xalancbmk 6/6 - 6/6 - 0/0 -
Total: 52/59 4 29/31 - 2/3 -
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Overall, membrush detected correctly 52 out of 59 c malloc functions (88%), 29 out of 31
c free routines (94%), and 2 out of 3 c realloc functions (67%). As we discuss below, many false
negatives stem from compiler optimizations, and we could prevent lots of them. As far as the
false positives are concerned, there were four. Even though strictly speaking, these functions are
false positives, in practice they were wrappers of an inlined allocator. Thus, by just looking at the
binary, membrush has no means to provide more accurate results (Balakrishnan and Reps 2010),
and the identified functions do provide the application with memory chunks acting as proper
allocators.
For the false negatives, we often missed a custom allocator because we did not even
classify it as a c malloc candidate in the first step. We identified two reasons for this:
(1) the allocator passes a pointer in an outgoing argument, and not in the return value, or
(2) instead of a pointer to a heap object, the allocator returns an offset, which the applica-
tion adds to the base of a buffer (often using a macro) before accessing the memory. E.g.,
in Apache, the apr rmm malloc, apr pool create ex custom allocators, and also the
apr rmm realloc reallocator, show this behavior. The same holds for the two missing allo-
cators in 400.perlbench, and one of the misses in 403.gcc. In order to reduce the first source of
false negatives, we could extend membrush to consider results returned in parameters also, using
the techniques described by ElWazeer et al. (2013). To handle the allocators returning an offset
instead of a pointer, we could use dynamic information flow tracking to tell if the value returned
by a function is later used to derive a pointer dereferencing heap memory. We leave it as a future
work.
The remaining two false negatives in 403.gcc stem from compiler optimizations. In the first
case, the application always jumps to, and never calls, one of the custom allocators. In the second
case, the alloc page routine is inlined. membrush detected four functions, which are, strictly
speaking, wrappers of alloc page, but in practice behave as allocators. We formally classified
them as false positives, even though they would be useful results in practice.
The two misses in the custom deallocator detection in Apache are caused solely by the
false negatives in the allocator detection. apr rmm malloc and apr pool create ex
are the only allocators that can reallocate the memory released by apr rmm free and
apr pool destroy, respectively. Since we did not detect the allocators, we did not manage
to trick them into reallocating the just reclaimed memory either. As a result the two deallocator
candidates did not pass the D3 filter.
In summary, we see that membrush’s algorithm proves effective with very few false positives.
The reason for all the important false negatives is that we do not identify the values returned by a
function accurately enough. However, we can employ existing techniques to further improve the
procedure.
The accuracy of the CMA classification. Figure 7 presents the types of custom memory
allocators classified by membrush. The bottom part of the graph contains correctly classified
functions, and the top one – misclassifications. In the 403.gcc benchmark, membrush erroneously
mistook obstacks for region based allocators. Even though these allocators are conceptually
obstack-based, each obstack is implemented as a list of chunks, and not as a region split into indi-
vidual buffers. The CMA inserts new nodes in the list whenever an allocation occurs, and deletes
a number of the most recently added ones upon deallocation. Thus, the addresses of allocated
chunks, i.e., list elements, do not form increasing subsequences as we expected (refer to Sec-
tion 7.2). However, as obstacks are a more generic version of regions, we are not too concerned
with this misclassification.
The accuracy of the buffer size estimation. In general, membrush either accurately esti-
mated how much memory the application requests from a custom allocator routine, or did not
provide any results. It means, that membrush’s analysis is accurate, and the results are not mis-
leading. membrush did not manage to deal with 7 out of 59 allocators. As we mentioned already,
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Fig. 7 The accuracy of membrush’s procedure to classify CMA routines. The bottom part of the graph
presents the allocators that were classified correctly, and the top one summarizes misclassifications
in all these cases, the application determines the size of the buffers when creating an allocator,
and not when allocating an object. Examples include the ngx array push function in nginx,
and the apr array push function in Apache. For all the remaining allocators, we found that
the size of the allocation is either of the form (arg + b) or it is a constant. These results were
correct.
8.2 Effectiveness and Necessity of Filtering Stages
We now present some statistics illustrating the analysis procedure. Due to space constraints, we
limit the discussion to the detection of the allocation routines. Analyzing the power of each
heuristic individually is hard, as filtering stages frequently depend on previous ones. For example,
to be able to test whether a pointer is used to write to memory (A2) or incurs a write before
read (A3), we must rst get this pointer from an allocator candidate (A1). Without A1, we cannot
evaluate the power of A2 and A3. Likewise, heuristic A5 tries to detect wrappers, but it cannot
exam the relation between them without the candidates. And so on. Moreover, even if we can
evaluate some heuristics separately in theory, doing so may not be practical. For instance, our
replay mechanism (A4) becomes prohibitively expensive if there is not a set of aggressive pre-
filtering stages to precede it.
Figure 8 shows how many allocator candidates membrush analyzed in each step of its
detection procedure. For all the applications, the A1 filter identifies up to 430 c malloc candi-
dates (with a median of 78), and their number gradually drops as membrush proceeds. Each time,
it finds at least 1 wrapper function (193 for 483.xalancbmk, with a median of 14), often invoking
the general-purpose allocator.
8.3 Practical Benefits - a Show Case
In this section, we demonstrate the benefits of applying membrush to a binary analysis. We
show that by furnishing an existing reverse engineering tool with information about the interface
implemented by a CMA, we significantly increase the accuracy of the analysis.
Howard (Slowinska et al. 2011) is a tool to reverse data structures in stripped binaries. To
analyze the memory allocated on the heap, it interposes on the system’s malloc and free
functions, and tracks each chunk of memory thus allocated as a data structure. Thus, when the
binary uses a CMA, Howard does not analyze the data structures at the granularity used by






















Fig. 8 The number of allocator candidates analyzed by membrush when verifying characteristics A1-A5. In
Apache, there are 35 functions after the A5 step, and as they belong to different shared libraries, they map to
3 functions in the libapr/libapr-util libraries
the application, and its accuracy is low. However, with the knowledge acquired by membrush,
Howard can interpose on the routines used by the CMA, and further perform its analysis.
As an example, we analyze heap memory in the smbget utility in Samba. As the core mem-
ory allocator, it uses talloc (Samba: talloc Documentation, http://talloc.samba.org/talloc/doc/
html/index.html), a hierarchical, reference counted memory pool system. membrush detects two
CMA routines: the talloc() allocator and the talloc free() deallocator. Table 3
presents the results obtained by Howard in two cases: (1) when it analyzes buffers allocated by
the general purpose allocation routines, and (2) when it also interposes on the talloc() and
talloc free() functions found by membrush. We split the results into four categories:
– OK: Howard identified the entire data structure correctly (i.e., a correctly identified structure
field is not counted separately).
– Flattened: fields of a nested structure are counted as a normal field of the outer structure.
– Missed: Howard misclassified the data structure.
– Unused: single fields, variables, or entire structures that were never accessed during our
tests.
As expected, when we use the vanilla version of Howard, all the memory that belongs to the
heap buffers that are later used by the CMA, is erroneously classified as arrays. Thus, we get
meaningful results only for the remaining 58.5% of the arrays and 53.2% of the structs allocated
on the heap.
In contrast, when we combine Howard with membrush, the accuracy of the analysis increases
significantly. Now, 93.2% of the arrays and 91.3% of the struct variables allocated on the heap
are classified correctly. We counted 8.7% flattened structures. They are all caused by a large
tevent req structure containing two nested substructures. As the addresses of the substruc-
tures fields are always calculated relative to the beginning of tevent req, Howard had no
means of classifying these regions as individual structures. The results show that by using mem-
brush, Howard is able to analyze the data structures actually used by smbget, instead of the large
buffers further split by the CMA routines.
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Table 3 The accuracy of the data structure analysis without and with membrush’s detection of CMA
functions
Category Without membrush With membrush
Arrays Structs Arrays Structs
The results in the number of variables:
OK 58.5% 53.2% 93.2% 91.3%
Flattened 0% 0% 0% 8.7%
Missed 41.5% 46.8% 6.8% 0%
Unused 0% 0% 0% 0%
The results in the number of bytes:
OK 60.4% 51.7% 92.4% 90.2%
Flattened 0% 0% 0% 9.8%
Missed 39.6% 48.3% 7.6% 0%
Unused 0% 0% 0% 0%
9 Limitations
membrush is not flawless. In this section, we discuss some generic limitations we have identified.
Compiler optimizations. In general, membrush detects CMA routines at runtime, so the
analysis results correspond to the optimized code, which may be different from what is speci-
fied in the source. This is known as WYSINWYX (What You See Is Not What You eXecute)
(Balakrishnan and Reps 2010), and it might lead to inaccuracies. For instance, in the 403.gcc
benchmark, membrush has no means to identify an inlined allocator, leading to the four functions
formally classified as false positives. Observe that analyzing the code that executes is of course
the right thing to do. Otherwise, we would not be able to analyze the real behavior of the binary
or perform proper forensics.
Function parameter identification. In order to identify the CMA routine candidates, and
later accurately match c free and c malloc invocations, membrush monitors the return value and
the arguments of functions. Our current implementation assumes that functions pass the return
value using the EAX register, and the parameters using the stack. As we saw in Section 8.1, this
is not always enough. However, we could extend our technique as proposed by ElWazeer et al.
(2013).
Identification of the value returned by a c malloc routine.We assume that c malloc returns
a pointer to the newly allocated buffer. In theory, however, it could pass an offset to a large chunk
of memory, that the application subsequently adds to the base of the chunk. This issue can be
solved with a more careful implementation. (It did not pose a problem in our experiments.)
Identification of the buffers released with a c free routine. Even though membrush can
accurately detect c free routines, there exist CMA implementations which make it very challeng-
ing to pinpoint all the memory that is freed. For instance, when one of the deallocators in the
Apache webserver releases a pool, it also reclaims all its subpools, which are separate regions
obtained from the general purpose allocator. Finding out in an implementation-agnostic way is
difficult.
Memory overhead. Our current implementation is somewhat constrained by memory limi-
tations. Specifically, we use 4 bytes per byte used by the application for the tag, and also need
to maintain the heap states, the data flow inside the functions, etc. For large applications, like
Firefox, we can not easily do this on our 32 bit systems.
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Performance overhead. The current implementation of membrush is slow. We use the
”replay” mechanism to validate the candidate for both c malloc and c free. For c malloc, it is
acceptable. However, when we have a lot of allocators, then we need to ”replay” all possible
c free and pair them. This step costs a lot of time (easily a few hours).
Determinism. Finally, we rely on deterministic execution of the applications. Basically, we
need to detect the candidates in the first run, then replay them in the second run to do validation.
For c malloc detection, it is fine, because we do not need to know which instance of c malloc we
need to replay and can just randomly pick any number of the c malloc instance and validate them.
For c free, it is much harder because we need to pair them. If needed, we can rely on the existing
record and replay mechanisms, such as (Guo et al. 2008; Honarmand and Dautenhahn 2013).
10 Related Work
In this section, we discuss some of the recent research related to both custom memory alloca-
tion (Section 10.1) and the identification of a specific functionality in a binary (Section 10.2).
10.1 Custom Memory Allocation
Custom memory allocation is a mature field. Surveys by Wilson et al. (1995) and Berger et al.
(2002) provide comprehensive overviews of various types of CMAs. Many real world applica-
tions use CMAs, typically to improve runtime performance. Well-known examples include the
Apache and Nginx webservers, the Firefox web browser and the gcc compiler, among many
others.
Many research projects, like (Schneider et al. 2006; Jula and Rauchwerger 2007, 2009;
Liu and Chen 2012; Lyberis et al. 2012), propose new memory managers designed for high-
performance memory allocation. Other approaches, e.g., (Berger and Zorn 2006; Lvin et al. 2008;
Novark and Berger 2010; Novark et al. 2009; Perence, B, Electric Fence, http://perens.com/
FreeSoftware/ElectricFence; Akritidis 2010; Serebryany et al. 2012), have used custom mem-
ory managers tailored to improve the memory safety of applications using them. They detect
or help mitigate heap corruptions, dangling pointers or reads of uninitialized data. For instance,
Electric Fence (Perence, B, Electric Fence, http://perens.com/FreeSoftware/ElectricFence) and
AddressSanitizer (Serebryany et al. 2012) place an inaccessible memory region after each block
allocated by malloc. Once a buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited, and an application over-
flows a heap buffer, the mechanisms spot an illegal memory access and raise an alert. Electric
Fence relies on the CPU page protection – for each heap buffer, it allocates an extra page that is
marked as inaccessible. DieHarder (Novark and Berger 2010) (a descendant of DieHard (Berger
and Zorn 2006)) finds memory bugs probabilistically. Specifically, its modified malloc func-
tion also adds redzones around memory regions returned to the user, but instead of marking
them as inaccessible, it populates the newly allocated memory with special magic values. If a
magic value in a redzone is overwritten, this will later be detected when the redzone is examined
on free.
Many approaches that detect buffer overflows, use-after-free or double-free attacks (Valgrind,
http://valgrind.org; Hastings and Joyce 1992; Dhurjati and Adve 2006; Caballero et al. 2012;
Slowinska et al. 2012) rely on information about the programs’ data structures—specifically,
the buffers that they should protect. Thus, in the presence of CMAs, their scope is limited to
memory chunks obtained from the general-purpose allocators. They would all directly benefit
from membrush—to offer a finer grained protection, and to detect attacks on the actual data
structures used by applications. For instance, BinArmor (Slowinska et al. 2012) protects heap
memory regions from being overflown by assuring that pointers keep pointing to the same buffer,
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i.e., it forbids a pointer assigned to buffer A from accessing buffer B. Currently, it targets memory
regions allocated by malloc, which is inaccurate if the application uses a CMA.
10.2 Identification of a functionality in a binary
While membrush aims to automatically identify CMA routines in existing binaries, a few recent
approaches, e.g., (Lutz 2008; Gro¨bert et al. 2011; Calvet et al. 2012), analyze binaries to see if
they use cryptographic primitives. These projects are related to membrush in the sense that they
also perform a dynamic analysis of a binary to search for predefined characterisitcs.
Noe Lutz (2008) proposes to use three indicators to recognize cryptographic code in execution
traces: presence of loops, a high ratio of bitwise arithmetic instructions, and entropy change in the
data manipulated by the code. However, these heuristics may lead to inaccuracies. For instance,
arithmetic instructions are used commonly, and may prove an unreliable indicator of the presence
of cryptographic primitives. Aligot (Calvet et al. 2012), on the other hand, proposes a method
that is independent of the actual implementation. It exploits the knowledge of the particular
input-output relationships of cryptographic functions. For an executed function, Aligot extracts
its input and output parameters, and compares them with those of known cryptographic routines.
This way, Aligot detected e.g., RC4, AES or MD5 algorithms used by binaries.
membrush is very different from these approaches. It relies neither on particular implementa-
tion features nor on a collection of known routines.
The most important outcome of our literature study, is that there is, to our knowledge, no work
on detection of custom memory allocation routines.
11 Conclusion
Custom memory allocators are very common in real-world applications, where they are used
instead of the standard allocation functions for performance reasons. Unfortunately, many exist-
ing binary analysis techniques depend on the ability to intercept the memory allocation functions.
Up to now this was not possible. In this paper, we presented a set of techniques for identifying
custom memory allocation, deallocation, and reallocation functions. Each of these three cate-
gories is handled by a separate pipeline of filters that aim to test fundamental properties that most
hold for almost any implementation. We evaluated our techniques on a diverse set of custom
memory allocator implementations and verify their accuracy on both SpecInt and several real-
world applications that are known to use custom memory allocators. In practically all cases, we
showed that we can find the allocation routines with great accuracy. Finally, we showed that the
outcome of our research is immediately useful by using the results in the Howard data structure
extraction tool.
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